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I. INTRODUCTION
We are at the beginning of behavioral law and economics. We
now see only dimly the outlines of the elaborate theory of decision
making that is to come. We are like the independent scholars who
examined the various parts of a very large animal and then tried to
put together their reports to describe that animal; we each have bits
and pieces of the elephant but no clear image of the entire beast. But
we should not despair. We must remember that this behavioralist
discipline is, as scholarly developments go, young. Indeed, the con-
ventional law and economics model, to which behavioral law and
economics is, in large part, a reaction, is itself relatively new. Law
and economics has only recently established itself as a vigorous area
of scholarship, as evidenced by regular courses within law schools,
multiple textbooks, scholarly conferences, professional organizations,
an AALS section, and so on. For instance, the American Law and
Economics Association held its first annual meeting in May, 1991.
Therefore, we should not be surprised if behavioral law and economics
exhibits a degree of awkwardness, lack of focus, some fumbling, and
other characteristics of youthfulness. In mitigation, I hasten to add
that there are very strong reasons to believe that this particular
youth will grow to a vigorous adulthood.
* Alumni Distinguished Professor, College of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, and Professor, University of Illinois Institute of Government and Public Affairs. I
should like to thank my colleague Russell Korobkin for his very helpful comments on an earlier
draft of these remarks.
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Nor should anyone be discouraged by the perfectly sensible
criticisms that others make of behavioral theories. They are right to
be critical and skeptical, and we should be, too. We must undertake
the difficult task of persuading them of the value of the behavioral
model.
I would make two more preliminary observations about behav-
ioral law and economics. First, it seems to me to be a perfectly natu-
ral development within law and economics. The fact that this behav-
ioral science interests legal academics testifies to the great impor-
tance and impact that law and economics has had on legal scholarship
in the late twentieth century. In fact, I think that the behavioral law
and economics literature takes its power from the great influence of
the law and economics movement. Behavioral law and economics
does not attempt to undo any of the remarkable accomplishments of
law and economics. Rather, it is an attempt to refine.1
Second, I find it remarkable that this literature is being
fleshed out principally in law schools, not in economics departments.
One might think that this literature on how people really make deci-
sions should be at the heart of modern microeconomic analysis, and
yet most economists are either uninterested or disdainful.2 I suggest
reasons below why those disciplines concerned with non-market
choice, such as law, may be more interested in behavioral decision
theory than are disciplines that focus on market choices. Legal aca-
demics should take great pride that they are so deeply involved in
1. In a recent roundtable discussion among Gary Becker, Ronald Coase, Morton Miller,
and Richard Posner, see Gary Becker et al., The Future of Law & Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
1129 (1997), and an accompanying article, see Richard Epstein, Law and Economics: Its
Glorious Past and Cloudy Future, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1167 (1997), the participants agreed that
the early and relatively easy phase of law and economics is ending. Evidence of this is what the
participants perceived as a slowing down in the rate of new discoveries within the field. As to
the future of law and economics, the participants had diverse but not discordant views. Only
one of them mentioned behavioral theories as a likely source of future insights in law and
economics.
2. Of course, some economists are deeply interested in the behavioral literature. See,
e.g., Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other
Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 75 (1998) (reviewing models and evidence
concerning the impact of economic institutions on preferences and commenting on implications);
Jon Elster, Emotions and Economic Theory, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 47 (1998) (discussing the
relationship between emotions and behavior in reference to economic theory); Matthew Rabin,
Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11 (1998) (discussing a selection of
psychological findings relevant to economics).
This field will not mark the first time that work in law and economics has interested legal
academics more than economists. For instance, Coase's article on social cost is the most heavily
cited law review article of the late twentieth century, but most economists dismiss the Coase
Theorem as a tautology. And while Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is a part of every modem legal
academic's stock of knowledge, most Ph.D. students in economics are not entirely sure what
that form of efficiency is.
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creating new knowledge about human decision making. To the extent
that this effort will succeed, as I am confident that it will, the flow of
knowledge will be in the opposite direction from what it has been in
the last twenty years: from the law to economics.
My purpose in these remarks is not to be a curmudgeon about
behavioral law and economics but to be a gentle prod. In doing so, I
shall stand back from the particular articles of this Symposium to
pick out broader trends in all of them. Part II sounds a few cau-
tionary notes about some brush-clearing and weed-pulling that the
new field needs to tend to. Part III suggests some aspects of be-
havioral law and economics that the papers in this Symposium might
have missed or on which they put, in my opinion, insufficient empha-
sis. Part IV considers the future directions of behavioral law and
economics.
II. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM CORRECTLY
In doing behavioral law and economics we must be very careful
to distinguish environmental and structural problems3 from cognitive
limitations. Both can make problems for legal decision makers, but in
very different ways that may require different correctives.
Traditional law and economics and microeconomic theory have long
recognized environmental and structural problems as causes of prob-
lems for rational actors and have long known what to do to correct
those problems. 4 Microeconomic theory typically refers to these condi-
tions as "market failure." Indeed, identification of market failure
problems (although they may not involve explicit market transac-
tions) and of their legal correctives has been the core contribution of
law and economics to legal scholarship. In contrast, the identification
3. By "environmental" and "structural" I mean the circumstances surrounding the
rational actor-for example, the "contractual environmentr (e.g., whether there are a few or
many consumers and suppliers) and the "structure of the interaction7 (e.g., whether there is
informational asymmetry or complete information or whether there are principals only or
agents acting on behalf of others).
4. But there is a distinction worth noting here between these problems and those arising
from cognitive limitations. Environmental and structural problems do not cause decision mak-
ers to behave irrationally. Rather, they drive a wedge between what is socially optimal and
what is individually optimal. To take an example, a rational consumer may purchase goods
from a monopolist. He has no choice, other than to forgo consumption of that good altogether.
But society suffers an efficiency loss from the fact that the monopolist, who is a rational profit-
maximizer, produces too little and charges too much. Generally speaking, the corrective for
environmental and structural problems is to align social and individual incentives for optimal-
ity.
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of cognitive limitations or information-processing problems and of
their legal correctives will be the core contribution of the behavioral
law and economics literature.
To be as clear as possible, I mean to say that decision makers
may make sub-optimal decisions for two very different sorts of rea-
sons:
* the environment in which they act or the nature of the decision
they are to make creates predictable social difficulties beyond
the ability of rational actors to control, and
" the decision makers cannot deal cognitively with the situation
in a socially or individually optimal manner.
This distinction is important because the legal or other social policy
correctives may differ for these two different classes of problem. The
law can go astray if it does not properly match the problem with the
solution. I consider these sources of socially sub-optimal decisions in
more detail below and then compare the very different correctives.
At least five environmental or structural situations (or situ-
ations of market failure)5 present problems of aligning decision
making by rational individual actors with social optima:
" collective action,
* external costs and benefits,
* public goods,
• informational asymmetries, and
• strategic behavior.
I briefly discuss how three of these situations-collective action, infor-
mational asymmetry, and external costs and benefits-present prob-
lems for rational actors and how the law might assist them to deal
with those problems. I then distinguish these problems and their
correctives from those of cognitive limitation.
Collective action or social choice problems arise when indi-
viduals must aggregate their individual choices into social choices.
The most elegant statement of this problem, the Arrow Impossibility
Theorem, states that there is no mechanism for aggregating individ-
ual preferences about social issues into a collective choice that does
not violate at least one of five minimal assumptions about what would
be an acceptable method of collective decision making.6
5. One might add "monopoly or monopsony" to this list.
6. The five assumptions are worth repeating because they are so easy to accept: (1) there
is no dictatorship-i.e., no one person's preferences determine the group choice; (2) each
individual has ordered all the alternatives according to her preferences and votes for that policy,
social welfare function, or candidate that ranks highest in her preference ordering, (3) if every
individual unanimously agrees on an, alternative, then that alternative is indicated as the
1750 [Vol. 51:1747
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Robert Rasmussen discusses an example of a collective action
problem in his contribution to this Symposium. 7 Suppose that a busi-
ness organization in economic distress has numerous creditors, some
of whom are secured, some of whom are not. As the likelihood of
business failure rises, the creditors may have an incentive to grab the
valuable assets of the organization, so as not to be left empty-handed
if the business liquidates. Collectively, the creditors would probably
be better off if they liquidated the firm's assets together and received
a pro rata share of the value of the assets or if they stayed their grab
for assets so as to allow the business to reorganize and, presumably,
return to profitability. But each creditor's concern for her own well-
being may outweigh her concern for the greater, but speculative, good
that would result from receiving a pro rata share or preserving the
organization's ability to do business.
This problem does not arise because of some failure in the
cognitive abilities of the actors, a point that Professor Rasmussen
recognizes. The creditors' grab for assets is a perfectly rational re-
sponse to a coordination problem. A legal corrective would create
credible and consistent incentives for the creditors to solve their
collective action problem. This justification accounts for how the
Bankruptcy Code deals with the race for valuable assets among ra-
tional creditors of a failing business.8
Rational actors have difficulties with another structural prob-
lem: severe informational asymmetries. For example, a rational
seller of property has little incentive to reveal latent defects to a
potential buyer because knowledge of the defect will reduce the
amount the buyer is willing to pay. The rational buyer should,
perhaps, inquire about latent defects, but he should recognize that the
seller may have an incentive not to be fully truthful. Law can help in
this situation by compelling the seller to disclose knowledge of latent
society's preference; (4) each individual's choices are complete, transitive, and reflexive; and (5)
the preferences between any two candidates or policies depend on how people rank those two
alternatives, not on how they rank other alternatives (this proposition is known as the "axiom of
the independence of irrelevant alternatives"). See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUALVALUES (2d ed. 1963).
For a more complete discussion of the Theorem and its implications for issues of constitu-
tional law, see generally Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Appreciation of the Bill of Rights: The
Limits and Potential of Law and Economics in Discussing Constitutional Issues, 1992 U. ILL. L.
REV. 189.
7. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, the Economic Analysis of
Bankruptcy Law and the Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1682-83 (1998).
8. See generally THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 12-14
(1986).
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defects (and to learn of them by making him liable for correcting
latent defects of which he should have known).9
But the law tolerates some informational asymmetries, and
some it even protects. For example, the law generally allows those
who have made a reasonable investment in acquiring
information-about, say, the location of valuable mineral deposits-to
profit from that knowledge without having to disclose it to other
parties to a transaction. Doing so maintains an incentive for future
parties to make socially beneficial investments in information
acquisition. Again, these issues of informational asymmetry affect
rational actors; they are not attributable to cognitive limitations.
External costs and benefits are the market-failure problems on
which law and economics has focused. For instance, the field has
viewed tort liability as a system to force potential injurers to
"internalize" costs that their conduct might impose on others. 0 The
absence of legal compulsion might create an incentive to take socially
insufficient care. There is nothing irrational about failing to take care
if one does not bear the appropriate cost of that failure. So, if we
believe that potential wrongdoers are not taking the correct amount of
care, the legal corrective may be to make the "price" for that conduct
higher, lower, or more certain."
I asserted above that market failure and cognitive limitations
point to very different legal correctives. To see the difference, suppose
there are two parties who might engage in a bargain but have not. Is
the failure to transact due to high transaction costs, the absence of a
cooperative surplus, the presence of irresolvable strategic behavior by
the bargainers, or the status quo bias? 2 If the problem is the lack of a
cooperative surplus, there can be no bargain, and the law should not
force one to occur. If the problem is high transaction costs, perhaps
the law should seek to reduce those costs; if the problem is strategic
behavior, the law should guard against overreaching; and if the prob-
lem is the status quo bias, then the law should be very careful in the
initial assignment of entitlements.
9. Some controversy exists about the efficiency of the rule of mandated disclosure,
largely because of problems of where to draw the line: Must the seller disclose knowledge of all
or only some latent defects? And if only some, which ones?
10. See, e.g., ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 270-94 (2d ed.
1997) (discussing an economic theory of tort liability).
11. It could also be that the law is assessing liability on the wrong basis-e.g., it
determines liability using negligence where it should use strict liability or vice versa.
12. See Russell B. Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REv. 608 (1998) (discussing generally those factors identified by law and economics
theorists as responsible for parties' failure to contract).
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To take another example, suppose that many drivers are not
wearing safety belts, causing more injuries than is socially desirable.
One source of the problem may be that otherwise rational drivers lack
information about the benefits of seat belts. If so, the government
might advertise the true benefit of seat belt use, introduce criminal
penalties for failure to wear seat belts, or enforce the "seat belt de-
fense" in private tort litigation involving motor vehicle injuries.13 All
of these correctives are consistent with the standard market failure
analysis of law and economics.
Alternatively, drivers may not wear seat belts because they
suffer from one of the cognitive limitations identified in the articles in
this Symposium. For instance, they may be overoptimistic about their
abilities as drivers, or they may not have readily available evidence of
the value of wearing seat belts, such as a friend's having recently had
a serious accident. 14 If these cognitive limitations cause people to take
insufficient care, an appropriate social corrective may take the
decision about safety restraints out of the hands of the drivers and
passengers and mandate the installation of passive restraints (such
as air bags) that operate independently of any judgment made by
those in the motor vehicle.
Correcting a social problem requires that we identify its cause.
Behavioral law and economics identifies a new set of causes for social
ills and, with those, a new set of correctives. But we must match the
problem to the solution. Rational actors have problems distinct from
those due to cognitive limitations. We must be sensitive to those
differences and craft our analyses appropriately.
13. That defense would allow the plaintiff to recover only the losses he would have
suffered if he had been wearing a seat belt. See Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167-68 (N.Y.
1974) (discussing the "seat belt defense").
14. This is an example of the availability heuristic, which holds that people use readily
available information rather than verifiable information to estimate the likelihood of an
uncertain event. For example, in deciding whether to smoke cigarettes for pleasure and to
chance the adverse health consequences of smoking, people frequently use easily available
information about the health hazards of smoking-such as whether anyone in their family has
suffered ill health because of cigarette smoking. The use of such information is not necessarily
wrong or insufficient, but it can be. See ScOrr PLous, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND
DECISIONMAING 121-30 (1993).
1998] 1753
.1754 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 51:1747
III. BROADENING THE ANALYSIS
In this Part I deal with two important topics that the papers in
the Symposium have treated inadequately in their analyses of cogni-
tive limitations-social norms and regulation by statute or
administrative agency. None of the papers in this Symposium has
mentioned one of the most hotly debated topics in law and economics
today-social norms.'5  Social norms, which operate largely beyond
conscious control, may solve some of the issues of cognitive limitation
that the authors have here identified. To the extent that they do,
there is less need for the law to correct for those problems. 6
As an example, consider one of the most frequent criticisms of
law and economics-that it ignores issues of fairness and favors
purely self-interested solutions. Law and economics tends to favor
unmediated bargaining solutions in allocative decision making.17 But
deemphasizing equitable consequences in the economic analysis of
law may not be a shortcoming.18 There is a strong tendency in human
15. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHouT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SE=rn
DIsPUTEs (1991) [hereinafter ORDER WrrHoUT LAW]; Robert D. Cooter, Normative Failure
Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 947 (1997) (focusing upon aspects of a comprehensive social
norm theory suitable for economic analysis); Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute
Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1986) [hereinafter Coase
and Cattle] (reporting the results of an investigation into how a California county resolves
livestock trespass disputes); Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, 3 J. ECON. PERSP.
99 (1989) (contrasting social science theories and discussing economists' attempt to reduce
norm-oriented action to optimizing behavior); Symposium, Law, Economics, and Norms, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996) (challenging some widely held understandings of rationality, choice and
freedom to develop); Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Social
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 330 (1997) (articulating an "esteem" theory of norms in legal economic
analysis); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903 (1996).
16. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 905-06, argues that, for example, a clever campaign has
succeeded in developing a norm against cigarette smoking among African-American teens. A
much smaller fraction of African-American teenagers (4.4 percent) smoke than do white
teenagers (22.9 percent). In large part this is attributable to a very successful advertising
campaign directed at making African-American teenagers believe that there is a white
conspiracy to get them to smoke. The telling advertising phrase is, "They used to make us pick
it. Now they want us to smoke it." Id. at 906. Sunstein also believes that government and
other groups in society can manufacture norms to achieve social ends. One should also
recognize that some social norms may conflict with what the society seeks to achieve, so that
law and social norms may be in conflict. For example, a norm of not associating with members
of another ethnic group would clearly conflict with what society aspires to achieve. Social norms
may also supplement the law and other conscious social devices in dealing with collective action
problems, strategic behavior, and so on.
17. In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor Ed Rubin caricatured these decisions
as defining a realm of social interaction in which material self-interest is paramount. See
Edward L. Rubin, Putting Rational Actors in Their Place: Economics and Phenomenology, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1705, 1715-16 (1998).
18. For a survey of the issues, see generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen,
Efficiency and Equity: What Can Be Gained by Combining Coase and Rawls?, 73 WASH. L. REV.
329 (1998) and the literature cited therein.
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interactions to favor fair solutions in cooperative bargaining
problems. Economists have conducted many experiments in which
bargainers have an opportunity to split a windfall gain and choose to
do so fairly. The best-known examples occur in the ultimatum
bargaining game. In that game two players do not meet but interact
through computer terminals. They split a sum of money (say, $20),
with one of the players making a proposal for division and the other
player either accepting it, in which case the players actually receive
the proposed division, or rejecting it, in which case neither of the
players gets anything. Economists predicted that the first player
would reason that if he proposed a lopsided division of the $20 in his
favor (say, $18 for himself and $2 for the other player), then the
second player would reason that $2 was better than nothing and
would accept the proposed division. As a result, economists believed
that the vast majority of divisions in ultimatum bargaining games
would be lopsided.
Experimenters who have supervised these games report two
fascinating conclusions. First, the modal response is an even division
of the stakes, and almost all of the subjects divide the surplus so as to
give the first player no more than sixty percent of the surplus and the
second player no less than forty percent.19 Second, the vast majority
of second players reject the proposed division and take nothing if the
first player proposes a split that leaves the second player with less
than thirty percent of the surplus.20
A very powerful social norm of fairness among the experimen-
tal subjects can plausibly explain these results. The norm is so pow-
erful that it induces the first player to propose a relatively equal
division of the stakes, even when he or she could have done much
better and there is no opportunity for retaliation. Further, it induces
the second player to take nothing when the proposed division lies
outside the acceptable norm. If that norm guides most bargaining
behavior when there is no face-to-face meeting, then it surely works
at least as strongly in bargains where there is face-to-face contact or
where there is an ongoing relationship between the bargainers. These
results suggest an important legal implication: Law does not need to
concern itself overly with the equitable division of cooperative sur-
19. See generally the literature cited in Rubin, supra note 17; see also Thomas S. Ulen,
Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 487 (1995).
20. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 18, at 334.
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pluses (when transactions can occur) because social norms police that
behavior.21
I do not want to be Pollyanna-ish about these matters. Surely,
in some circumstances, social norms may fail to catch overreaching
behavior. Law can correct for such circumstances, as with the uncon-
scionability defense in contract law. But that qualification aside,
social norms may serve to correct for some of the problems that a
single-minded regard for efficiency might miss. 22 And yet my own
discussion of the social norms literature is incomplete; I have not yet
explicitly shown how social norms might serve as correctives for cog-
nitive limitations.23
The ability of legislative action and ex ante administrative
agency regulation to correct problems of cognitive limitations also
deserve greater attention than the Articles in this Symposium have
given them. The authors here have dwelt on crafting common law
rules to take account of limited rationality among legal decision
makers. But in some circumstances a statute or ex ante
administrative regulation might furnish a better corrective.2
Several broad issues demand a fuller consideration of these
alternative correctives for cognitive limitations. One might be called
the "Olympian perch" problem: In some circumstances, legal decision
makers are not subject to the same distortions of judgment that afflict
those whom they seek to regulate. Such distortions might suggest
that bench trials or rulemaking by administrative agencies
determines liability better than jury trials.
21. As a corollary, law could focus on encouraging efficient behavior, including the
correction of cognitive limitations that lead to socially sub-optimal outcomes, and leave
equitable considerations to social norms.
22. Ellickson gives one of the most intriguing studies of the relationship between social
norms and law. See ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 15; Coase and Cattle, supra note 15.
Both his pieces there cited study the relationship between ranchers and farmers in Shasta
County, California, with respect to the issue of straying cattle. He finds that law was irrelevant
to the manner in which people in Shasta County dealt with that issue. People conformed their
behavior to social norms, not to the law, and the prevailing norm was one of neighborliness. For
instance, if cattle strayed onto someone's land, the expectation was that he would call the owner
and feed and care for the cattle until the owner could come to retrieve them. People resorted to
litigation only when norms broke down, because they perceived the resort to litigation as
unneighborly.
23. In addition to norms, unconscious or guided emotional responses may seek to achieve
the same social benefits as do norms and law. For instance, shame, honor, guilt, and a distrust
for envy are all emotions that are difficult to counterfeit and whose ends are the limitation of
socially destructive behavior.
24. For a consideration of the relative strengths of the market, common law rules and
standards, and administrative agency regulation as correcting conditions of market failure, see
NEIL K KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONs IN LAW, ECoNoMICs
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
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But public law solutions have their own problems. Even if
cognitive limitations distort judgment of legal decision makers less
than that of individual decision makers, public choice considerations
may distort the decision making of legislators and administrators
away from social optima.5 These problems are so well known that
they do not require review here. I bring them up solely because in
making a reasoned assessment of whether common law rules, social
norms, statutes, or administrative agency regulations best correct for
a given cognitive limitation, we should take account of the public
choice distortions that may attend the legislative and administrative
processes.
IV. WHAT NEXT FOR BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS?
Behavioral law and economics should address three matters in
the near future. First, the field needs much more nuance in its find-
ings.26 For instance, we need to know if in some circumstances cogni-
tive limitations affect all actors, and if in others they only affect
certain people. Can we distinguish people who rarely make cognitive
errors so that, for example, they can waive their right to Social
Security and assume complete responsibility for their own retirement,
or waive the requirement that they purchase a car with a passive
restraint device, on the theory that they truly understand the risks
they run?
The current state of our learning seems to suggest that any
shortcoming in cognitive abilities that we discover applies to everyone
in similar circumstances. Take the ability of individuals to deal with
risk. The behavioral literature is replete with examples of the diffi-
culties that otherwise sensible individuals have in dealing with risk.27
Indeed, these studies imply that risk presents insurmountable prob-
lems for everyone. Surely this implication goes too far. And even if
we accept the literature's conclusion at face value, so that we presume
everyone incapable of adequately dealing with risk, a plausible re-
sponse is, "So what? Mind your own business. I'm free to make my
own mistakes."
25. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHLI P. FRIcKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
26. This is one of the central points in Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral
Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1741-44(1998).
27. See, e.g., PLOUS, supra note 14, at 131-44.
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This objection is no mere quibble. It has profound implications
for legal issues like privatization of state-run retirement accounts.
The literature on cognitive limitations offers some justification for
government-mandated saving for retirement.2 Evidence suggests
that almost everyone has problems with intertemporal choice, in that
they value immediate gratification far more than delayed gratification
in a manner that suggests an inconsistent rate of time preference.29
For example, all of us wish that we had the self-control not to eat
foods that, although good-tasting, may have dire consequences for
future health. Because similar problems present themselves with
respect to current consumption versus saving for future consumption
and because those who fail to save may become a burden on all the
rest of us in their old age, we can make a fairly strong case for com-
pelling individuals to save for their future.
These considerations do not really reach the issue of whether
the mandatory retirement program should be publicly or privately
provided. As a matter of public policy, retirement income ensures
that people have a sufficient amount of money on which to live when
they stop working, so they do not become wards of the state. That
concern seems separable from the cognitive impairment issue of who
should do the investing of each person's government-mandated sav-
ings. Of course, a private retirement fund entails important adminis-
trative details. For example, the government should guarantee the
solvency of the private fund 3 and insure that the return on the pri-
vate providers' portfolio suffices to generate an adequate retirement
income. But these details are manageable and relatively uncontro-
versial. A recognition of cognitive limitations adds little to the issue
of whether privatization of Social Security is a good idea-given that
those limitations have already made out a case for compulsory re-
tirement savings.31
28. So do others. See, e.g., RIcHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 262-64 (1996).
29. See ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 14-18 (1993); George Ainslie,
Beyond Microeconomics, in THE MULTIPLE SELF 133 (Jon Elster ed., 1986); George Ainslie,
Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and Impulse Control, 82 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 463 (1975).
30. The federal government, through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, provides
insurance for some deposits in financial institutions. Similarly, the Employees Retirement and
Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C. and at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)), established the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation to protect retirees against losses because of underfunding or malfeasance
in respect of a retirement account.
31. I leave out discussion of whether individuals should be allowed to waive mandatory
retirement savings. Could someone warrant that she did not need retirement savings and that
in exchange for not having to save, she would guarantee not to become a ward of the state? The
practical impediments to such waiver are immense-such as, would society really be unwilling
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A second issue requires attention in the near term: We must
account for the fact that rational choice theory adequately explains
and predicts market behavior, but less accurately explains and pre-
dicts non-market behavior. Three factors recommend the rational
choice model as a better guide to market choices than to non-market
choices. First, market choices are frequent and routine. Even if peo-
ple make mistakes when they make their first market choices, they
have an opportunity to learn through repeated transactions.
Moreover, in those instances in which market transactions are rare in
an individual's life-as in, for example, the purchase of a house-a
first-time purchaser can learn from others who have made these rare
transactions. Generally, however, the rarer a market choice is, the
more difficulties it creates for individuals. In contrast, many non-
market choices are so rare that people do not have repeated opportu-
nities to learn and to make corrections. Even though one might con-
suit others for help with these infrequent non-market choices, each
individual's circumstances with respect to many of these choices are
so highly particularized that the others' experiences may not be an
appropriate guide to one's own best course of action. Consider, for
example, love, marriage, and child-rearing.
Second, market choices are mediated through money, making
commensurability much easier. We do not have problems of
"comparing apples and oranges" in many market transactions because
the choices almost always involve the purchaser's surrendering
money. Because the purchaser knows or could learn the market price
of other goods and services or can compute an opportunity cost, he can
make a fairly accurate estimate of the comparative worth of very
different courses of action, such as whether to buy a new car or to
spend another year in school.32 By contrast, non-market choices fre-
quently do not involve a common measuring rod like money.
Therefore, making comparisons across non-market alternatives or
between a market and a non-market alternative may be very difficult.
How does one compare the profound experience of parenthood with
the cost of an exotic vacation?
to help someone who executed the waiver but then showed up on society's doorstep penniless at
age 70? More generally, should society allow some people to waive legal rules addressed at
correcting cognitive limitations that many people have? If so, under what conditions would we
allow someone to execute such a waiver?
32. One might argue that the presence of money allows only a comparison of the
pecuniary aspects of market choice. It is precisely the non-pecuniary aspects, even of market
choices, that give people difficulty.
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Third, market choices are transparent, save when they are
complex and reserved for specialists, as in some options valuations.
There is frequently a single best (optimal) decision. But non-market
choices are often difficult to understand and may have a variety of
suitable outcomes. For example, only a specialist in the law can un-
derstand the difference in obligations under comparative versus con-
tributory negligence regimes. Some people recognize their shortcom-
ings and consult a specialist, especially when the stakes are high.
But not everyone knows or will admit their inability to see through a
problem, and they will not consult a specialist when faced with a
complex non-market choice.
Taken together, these issues of frequency, commensurability,
and transparency are at the heart of why rational choice theory does a
far better job of explaining market choices than non-market choices.
I hope that behavioral law and economics will soon address a
third issue-the distinction between ingrained cognitive limitations
and those that are not hard-wired into us and are therefore subject to
behavioral modification. The first kind of cognitive limitation is part
of our evolutionary adaptation; the second results from application of
unfamiliar skills. If natural selection has hard-wired our brains for a
particular cognitive limitation (e.g., overoptimism or finding order
where there is mere randomness), then we probably cannot fully es-
cape those limitations. While we might will ourselves not to be over-
optimistic, that desire likely cannot overcome our instinct. If the law
recognizes that these limitations are adaptive and hard-wired, then it
might take account of them. To consider a somewhat controversial
example, Professor Owen Jones observes that stepparents are forty to
one hundred times more likely to abuse their adopted children than
are natural parents to abuse their children.33 Moreover, when natural
parents abuse their children, they far more often abuse their younger,
smaller, and less healthy offspring.3 Professor Jones attributes these
data to forces of evolutionary adaptation that select for human minds
that respond to children in particular ways.
The legal implications of these hard-wired forces may be pro-
found. Law and economics might deter stepparent child abuse by
prescribing more severe, swifter, or more certain sanctions for step-
parents who abuse their children than for natural parents who abuse
33. See Owen D. Jones, Law and Biology: Toward an Integrated Model of Human
Behavior, 8 J. CONTEmP. LEGAL IssuEs 167 (1997). For a discussion of broader issues, see
generally E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 595
(1997).
34. See Jones, supra note 33, at 181.
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their children. To the extent that individuals cannot control this
abusive behavior, different correctives may be necessary. One might
recommend special counseling for stepparents to alert them to these
behaviors and for natural parents to warn them of the special dangers
of abuse faced by their younger, smaller, and less healthy children.
Whatever else law might do to address hard-wired behavioral prob-
lems, those legal solutions almost certainly must be mandatory rules,
not waivable rules or vague standards.
Evolutionary adaptation does not always produce thorny prob-
lems for communal, neighborly living. It sometimes solves social
problems by favoring cooperative solutions to selfish ones.35 As noted
above, we seem to be disposed to cooperate with others in many social
settings, as in the division of a cooperative surplus.36 If this disposi-
tion holds true, then law need not agonize over redistributive issues.37
Other cognitive limitations are attributable principally to a
lack of learnable skills. Many puzzles applying probability calculus
fall into this category.3 8 Consider an example-the famous base rate
fallacy. Suppose that a deadly disease afflicts one in 10,000 people
and that a test detects the disease with ninety-nine percent accuracy.
If you test positive, what is the probability that you actually have the
disease? Most people, unskilled in probabilistic calculations, answer,
"ninety-nine percent." But that answer is wildly inaccurate.
Suppose that 10,000 people take the test. Of those 10,000,
only one actually has the disease. Presumably, this person will test
positive.39 Of the 9,999 who do not have the disease but took the test,
one percent will falsely test positive. That is, ninety-nine people will
test positive for the disease, even though they do not have it.40 A total
35. For more on this theme, see THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND
THE GENERATION OF CULTURE (John Barkow et al. eds., 1992); ROBERT AXELROD, THE
COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION AND
COLLABORATION (1997); ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); FRANS DE
WAAL, GOOD NATURED (1996); MATr RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND
THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1997); MATT REDLEY, THE RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE
EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE (1993).
36. See Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Behavioral Foundations of Reciprocity: Experimental
Economics and Evolutionary Psychology, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 335 (showing the two results
mentioned and contending that experiments with undergraduate subjects show that human
beings are adaptively programmed to cooperate with others, even in single-play games, and to
identify and punish cheaters).
37. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 18, at 342-43.
38. See PLOUS, supra note 14, at 115-16; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the
Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237(1973).
39. Testing positive is not certain to happen because the test is not infallible. It could give
a false negative.
40. Rounding down, for convenience; the actual figure is 0.01 x 9,999 = 99.99.
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of 100 people test positive for the disease, but only one is actually in-
fected. Therefore, the probability that you actually have the disease,
given that you tested positive, is one percent.41
These pitfalls in applying unfamiliar cognitive skills may also
have profound legal implications, but they probably differ signifi-
cantly from the correctives for hard-wired limitations. We can edu-
cate decision makers about the base rate fallacy so that they can bet-
ter deal with situations calling for Bayesian inference. For instance,
Professors Finkelstein and Fairley call for explicit instruction in
Bayesian inference for jurors who must evaluate identification evi-
dence.42 Others suggest that instead of requiring everyone to become
comfortable with probability calculus, we should encourage society to
convey Bayesian information to decision makers in easily understand-
able ways. As an example, a physician might convey the information
discussed above to someone whose test was positive in this way:
[In recent years the prevalence of HIV in German men who do not belong to a
risk group is 0.01 percent, the sensitivity (hit rate) of a typical IV test is
99.99 percent, and the false positive rate is perhaps 0.01 percent. The
prospects of a patient who has tested positive do not sound very good. But nowimagine that a doctor counseled a patient as follows: "Think of 10,000
heterosexual men like you. We expect one to be infected with the virus, and he
will almost certainly test positive. Of the 9,999 men who are not infected, one
additional man will test positive. Thus we get two who test positive, but only
one of them actually has the virus. All we know at this point is that you have
tested positive. So the chance that you actually have the virus is about 50-50."43
Couching probabilities in the form of frequencies in this fashion vastly
improves the accuracy of people, including specialists, at estimating
the probabilities.
Undoubtedly, many gradations of cognitive limitation separate
the hard-wired and learnable categories I have identified. And many
possible legal correctives remain to be marshalled, such as shifting
burdens of proof, favoring rules over standards, altering liability
rules, replacing common law rules or standards with administrative
41. I leave as an exercise for the reader the computation of the conditional probability of
actually having the disease if a second test, administered only to those who tested positive the
first time, is positive. One should always get a second opinion. A third opinion is a clincher, as
you should be able to show.
42. See Michael 0. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to
Identification Evidence, 83 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1970). Professor Tribe criticized this view in
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV.
L. REv. 1329(1971).
43. STEvEN PINKER, How THE MiND WoKs 348 (1998).
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rules or statutes, and so on. One of the most productive things that
behavioral law and economics can do in the next decade is to catego-
rize and place cognitive limitations on the hard-wired/learnable
spectrum and match legal and other correctives to these categories.
Ultimately, we shall produce a crisp and clear set of cognitive failures
with their correctives that commands the same consensus as the cur-
rent set of market failures and correctives.
V. CONCLUSION
Behavioral law and economics is exciting, and it is only begin-
ning. A new theory of human decision making is in the offing, one
that captures the best of rational choice theory and supplements it
with a subtle view of how and why and when humans make mistakes
in judgment. In light of this promise of a more comprehensive theory,
only "a mind debauched by learning"4 could stubbornly cling to a
version of rational choice theory in which errors arise only from condi-
tions of market failure and not from predictable fallibilities of the
human mind.
44. WILLIAM JAMEs, PSYCHOLOGY: BRMFER COURSE394(1892). The full quote is this:
It takes ... a mind debauched by learning to carry the process of making the natural
seem strange, so far as to ask for the why of any instinctive human act. To the
metaphysician alone can such questions occur as: Why do we smile, when pleased, and
not scowl? Why are we unable to talk to a crowd as we talk to a single friend? Why does
a single maiden turn our wits so upside-down? The common man can only say, "Of
course, we smile, of course our heart palpitates at the sight of the crowd, of course we
love the maiden, that beautiful soul clad in that perfect form, so palpably and flagrantly
made for all eternity to be loved.
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